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Yell: CA Sexually Violent Predator Act

COMMENT
THE CALIFORNIA SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT AND
THE FAILURE TO MENTALLY
EVALUATE SEXUALLY VIOLENT
CHILD MOLESTERS
INTRODUCTION

Children are extremely vulnerable and require the
protection of adults. Children who are sexually molested are
subject to chronic psychological problems and may become
molesters themselves.! Children who have suffered more
severe sexual abuse experience more traumatic symptoms
throughout their lives. 2 Adolescent sex offenders who were
sexually abused as children tend to abuse victims in ways
similar to their own sexual abuse. 3 Some of these similarities
include age, 4 sex, 5 relationship 6 and the sex act performed. 7 In
1 Irving Prager, "Sexual Psychopathy" and Child Molesters: The Experiment Fails,
6 J. Juv. L. 49, 62-63 (1982).
2 See Scott A. Ketring & Leslie L. Feinauer, Perpetrator-Victim Relationship: Longterm Effects of Sexual Abuse for Men and Women, 27 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 109, 117
(1999). In addition children who are sexually abused by father figures experience
significantly more trauma symptoms than do children sexually abused by other family
members, friends, or strangers. Id. at 116.
3 See Carol Veneziano, Lousi Veneziano & Scott LeGrand, The Relationship
Between Adolescent Sex Offender Behaviors and Victim Characteristics with Prior
Victimization, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 363, 370 (2000).
4
See id. Adolescent sex offenders who were "sexually abused when they were
younger than the age of 5 were twice as likely to victimize someone younger than the
age of 5." Id.
5 See id. Adolescent sex offenders "were twice as likely to have sexually abused
males if they had been so abused by males." Id.
6 See id. Adolescent sex offenders who were abused by a relative were 1.5 times
more likely to abuse a relative. Id.
7 See id. Adolescent sex offenders were more likely to abuse their victims using sex
acts similar to their own abuse. Id.
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addition, adult women who have been sexually abused as
children are more likely than nonvictims to report being
sexually assaulted and/or raped in adulthood. s
Public outrage and media coverage of violent sexual
attacks has resulted in the creation of federal and state laws to
protect children from child molesters.9 Certain laws have been
created to allow for the notification of law enforcement and the
local community when certain child molesters have decided to
take up residency in that community.1° Laws that allow for the
civil commitment of sexually violent predators take the
protection of children one step further.1 1 These laws ensure
that particular child molesters will not have the opportunity to
continue to harm children. 12 In order to be civilly committed in
California, a convicted child molester must be assessed as
being a future risk to repeat sexually violent behavior.1 3
Studies have identified many factors that are possible
predictors of future sexually violent behavior.1 4 There is no
definitive way, however, to confidently assess the danger a
8 Terri L. Messman-Moore & Patricia J.
Long, Child Sexual Abuse and
Revictimization in the Form of Adult Sexual Abuse, Adult Physical Abuse, and Adult
Psychological Maltreatment, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 489, 498 (2000).
9 See Judge Joan Comparet·Cassani, A Primer on the Civil Trial of a Sexually
Violent Predator, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1057, 1060-1061 (2000).
10 See id. at 1061. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (West 2003) (includes the Jacob
Wetterling Law, Megan's Law and the Pam Lyncher Act).
11
See generally Stats. 1995, c. 762 § 1 (S.B. 1143) (Cal.), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96Ibilllsenlsb_11011150/sb_1143_bilL951011_chaptered.html (Sept. 11, 1995) (finding by legislature that
a certain group of sex offenders should be civilly committed in order to protect society).
12 Id.
13 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2003).
14 See generally M.E. Rice, V.L. Quinsey & G.T. Harris, Sexual Recidivism Among
Child Molesters Released From a Maximum Security Psychiatric Institution, 59 J.
CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 381, 383 (1991) (finding that the best predictors are if
the child molester has ever been in a correctional institution, ever been convicted of a
sexual crime, and if they had ever received a diagnosis of a personality disorder); see
generally RA. Prentky, RA. Knight & A.F.S. Lee, Risk Factors Associated with
Recidivism Among Extrafamilial Child Molesters, 65 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 141, 147 (1997) (finding that fixation, paraphilias, and the number of prior
sexual offenses are the best predictors of sexual offense recidivism); see generally RK.
Hanson, RA. Steffy & R Gauthier, Long-term Recidivism of Child Molesters, 61 J.
CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 646, 649 (1993) (finding that the best predictive
variables were if the perpetrator had "never been married, had prior sexual
convictions, and admitted to many previous offenses."); see generally H.E. Barbaree &
W.L. Marshall, Deviant Sexual Arousal, Offense History and Demographic Variables as
Predictors of Reoffense Among Child Molesters, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 267, 278 (1988)
(finding that three factors that correlate with deviant sexual arousal are the amount of
force used, the act of intercourse, and the number of previous victims).
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person poses, either for the immediate moment or for the
distant future.1 5 This is an often-cited reason for not using the
prediction of future sexual violence to civilly commit a sex
offender. 16
An argument against civilly committing sex
offenders is that sex offenders may not have committed another
violent sex act if they were allowed freedom.17 This Comment
takes the opposite stance by showing how the California
Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA"),18 while using
assessment of future dangerousness, does not civilly commit a
majority of sexually violent predators. Consequently, the
California SVPA does not protect children as intended.
Section I of this Comment explores both past and current
methods of protecting potential victims from sexually violent
predators. Section I also discusses the constitutional issues
surrounding modern sexually violent predator civil
commitment laws and the ongoing debate regarding the ability
to predict future dangerousness. Section II analyzes the
problems with the California SVPA, specifically in regards to
the requirements under the Act and the implications these
problems create. Finally, in Section III, solutions are proposed
to the problems within the Act, as well as future directions
government and society need to take to further protect
children.
1. BACKGROUND

State and federal laws that pertain specifically to sexual
predators are not new.1 9 As early as 1937, Michigan law
allowed for the civil commitment of sexual psychopaths. 20
States enacted these early sexual predator laws to protect
15 See Douglass P. Boer, Robin J. Wilson, Claudine M. Gauthier & Stephen D. Hart,
Assessing Risk of Sexual Violence: Guidelines for Clinical Practice, in IMPULSIVITY:

THEORY AsSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 326, 327 (C.D. Webster ed., 1997).
16 Cf Dennis M. Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictions of Sex Offender
Recidivism, and the "Sexual Preditor" Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 97, 9798 (1998) (discusses how some people argue that the inaccuracy of predicting
dangerousness can lead to the unnecessary depravation of rights).
17 Id.
18 CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 2003).
19 See generally Raquel Blacher, Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath"
Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 889, 890-897 (1995) (gives the history behind laws pertaining to sexual offenders
beginning with English common law).
20 Id. at 897.
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society and to treat the offender.21 Between the 1930's and the
1950's the prevailing theory was that sexual predators were
not able to control themselves and, thus, were not responsible
for their actions. 22 A few jurisdictions, such as Minnesota and
the District of Columbia, provided civil commitment for sexual
offenders regardless of whether or not criminal charges were
filed against them. 23 To warrant civil commitment, the
offender must have committed a sexual transgression and be
powerless to prevent himself or herself from committing future
sexual crimes. 24 Other states, such as Colorado, committed
convicted sex offenders to hospitals instead of sending them to
prison. 25
In the 1960's, California enacted the Mentally Disordered
Sex Offender ("MDSO") statute. 26 The MDSO provided for civil
commitment of convicted sex offenders instead of prison time if
the person was a "mentally disordered sex offender" who could
benefit from treatment. 27 If there was a determination that the
person could not benefit from treatment, then the offender was
sentenced in criminal court.28
Mentally disordered sex
offenders were placed in hospitals for treatment while sex
offenders who were not found to be mentally disordered served
time in prison. 29
By 1960, more than half of the states had civil commitment
statutes that allowed for the treatment of sexual offenders, but
by the end of the 1980's, the number of states with sexual
offender civil commitment laws was reduced by half.3o Most
states repealed the laws based on lack of effective treatment,
civil rights concerns and evidence that sexual offenders were
not necessarily mentally ill. 31 For example, California repealed

See id. at 900·90l.
See id. at 897-899.
23 See John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil
Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1996); see also D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3804(a) (2003) (states the law in the District of Columbia pertaining to
civil commitment of sex offenders).
24 Cornwell, surpa note 23, at 1297-1298.
25 Id. at 1298.
26 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6316 (West 2003).
27 Id. at § 6316(a)(1).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30
Cornwell, supra note 23, at 1297.
31
Blacher, supra note 19, at 906.
21

22

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/7

4

Yell: CA Sexually Violent Predator Act

2003]

CA. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT

299

the MDSO statute because the legislature acknowledged that
sex crimes were not the result of a mental illness. 32 Some
states, however, soon found that the existing laws were not
always able to protect the public from sexual predators who
would reoffend once they were released from incarceration. 33
The first state to deal with this lack of protection was
Washington. 34
In May 1989, a little boy was riding his bike in South
Tacoma, Washington when he was sexually attacked and
mutilated. 35 His attacker, Earl Shriner, had recently been
released from prison and had a history of violent sexual
attacks. 36 Law enforcement officials were aware of the danger
that Shriner posed to the people of Washington, but under
their existing laws they had no choice but to let him out of
prison. 37 The people of Washington were outraged that a
known, dangerous offender had been released from prison. 38 In
response, Washington created a task force consisting of victims'
family members, attorneys, legislators, treatment professionals
and academics. 39 This task force reviewed the existing laws
and constructed a proposal to tighten existing sex offender
legislation. 40 In 1990, Washington enacted the first modern
civil commitment law for violent sexual offenders. 41
The Washington statute provides for the civil commitment
of sexually violent predators, who are defined as "any person
who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure

Stats. 1981, c. 928, § 1 p. 3485 (Cal.).
See generally Cornwell, supra note 23, at 1298·1299 (discusses how some states
enacted their laws in response to released sex offenders that were not subject to civil
commitment but were known to be dangerous).
34
Michelle Johnson, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Sentencing of
Sexual Predators, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.R. 39, 42 (1998).
35 David Boerner, Predators and Politics: A Symposium on Washington's Sexually
Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525, 525 (1992).
36 See generally id. at 525·527 (lists the criminal history of Earl Shriner).
37
See id. at 527·530.
38
See generally id. at 528·530 (cites newspaper articles that indicate the public's
frustration).
39
Id. at 538.
40 Id.
41
Blacher, supra note 19, at 907.
32

33
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facility."42 A mental abnormality, for purposes of this statute,
is defined as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person
to the commission of criminal sexual acts .... "43 The phrase
"likely to engage in predatory acts" means that the person
"more probably than not will engage in such acts if released
"44
Since Washington's creation of a civil commitment law for
sex offenders, other states have followed suit. 45 Modern sexual
predator laws are different from previous laws in regards to
when the sexually violent predator is hospitalized for
treatment. 46 Earlier laws permitted treatment in hospitals
instead of incarceration, while the newer laws provide for
treatment in hospitals only after completion of the prison
sentence. 47

A.

FEDERAL LAw

The States are not alone in their concern about violent
sexual predators.48 In response to violent attacks on children,
the federal government enacted registration and notification
laws 49 aimed at identifying and monitoring sex offenders. 50 In
1989, Jacob Wetterling, an eleven-year-old boy from
The man responsible for his
Minnesota, disappeared. 51
abduction and disappearance was never found. 52 In 1994, the
federal government enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration

WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(16) (West 2003).
Id. § 71.09.020(8).
44 Id. § 71.09.020(7).
45 See Blacher, supra note 19, at 914.
46 See Johnson, supra note 34, at 45.
47 Id.
48 See generally Caroline Louise Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional
Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L.
REV. 89, 94 (1996) (discusses Congress' creation of laws to protect the public from sex
offenders).
49 See Comparet·Cassani, supra note 9, at 1060·1064.
50 Id. at 1060·1061.
51 See Lewis, supra note 48, at 89.
52 The Jacob Wetter ling Foundation, http://www.jwf.org/jwCabout.html (full story)
(last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
42
43
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Act,53 which requires sex offenders to register with local
authorities for ten years after their release from prison. 54
In 1996, the federal government amended the Jacob
Wetterling Act to incorporate the Pam Lyncher55 Sexual
Offender Tracking and Identification Act, which required
lifetime registration of serious sex offenders and created a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) national database to
track sex offenders. 56 When a state has not met the minimum
registration requirements for sex offenders set forth in the
Jacob Wetterling Law, the FBI is now required to register the
offenders for that state. 57
The 1994 kidnapping, rape and murder of 7-year-old
Megan Kanka in New Jersey outraged the nation and led to the
enactment of Megan's Law. 58 Unbeknownst to the community,
Megan's neighbor, who committed these crimes, was a
convicted pedophile who lived with two other convicted child
molesters.59 Megan's Law requires mandatory notification of
the offender's whereabouts to the community in which specified
sex offenders live. 60
The federal government has not enacted any statutes that
require civil commitment for sexually violent predators. 61 The
United States Supreme Court has, however, had the
opportunity to rule on controversial constitutional issues that
have been raised by the involuntary civil commitment of
sexually violent predators under state statutes. 62 Hendrick's
put forth constitutional challenges to Kansas' Sexually Violent
42 U.S.C. § 14071 (West 2003).
See id.; see also Wayne A. Logan, A Study in '~ctuarial Justice:" Sex Offender
Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 598-600 (2000)
(summarizes the law).
55 Pam Lyncher was an anticrime activist who was killed in a plane crash. Daniel
M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND.
L.J. 315, 329 n. 95 (2001).
56 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B)(i-iii) (West 2003).
57 [d. § 14072(c); see also Comparet-Cassani, supra note 9, at 1065 (summarizes the
law).
58 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (a)-(f) (West 2003); see also Blacher, supra note 19, at 915-916
(explains the events that led up to the enactment of the law).
59 Blacher, supra note 19, at 915-916.
60 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (a)-(f) (West 2003); see also Blacher, supra note 19, at 916
(summarizes the law).
61 See Blacher, supra note 19, at 917-918.
62 See generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (case where the United
States Supreme Court deals with constitutional issues surrounding sexually violent
predator statutes).
53
54
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Predator ("SVP") civil commitment laws due to violations of
due process rights, the prohibition against double jeopardy and
ex post facto laws. 63
In 1994, Kansas adopted a SVPA, which provided for the
civil commitment of a sex offender if that person had been:
(1) Either charged or convicted of a sexually violent offense;
(2) Had a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and
(3) As a result of this abnormality or disorder was likely to
commit future violent sexual offenses. 64

Kansas first used the act to civilly commit Leroy
Hendricks, a sex offender with a history of molesting
children. 65 Hendricks based his constitutional challenges to
the act on substantive due process, double jeopardy and ex post
facto principles. 66 The Kansas Supreme Court decided that the
Act violated Hendricks' substantive due process rights because
the term "mental abnormality" did not meet the "requirement
that involuntary civil commitment must be predicated on a
finding of mental illness."67 The State of Kansas filed a
petition of certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court
granted in 1996. 68
In 1997, in Kansas v. Hendricks, the United States
Supreme Court found the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator
Act to be constitutional. 69 The United States Supreme Court
held that the Act's terminology satisfied substantive due
process. 70 The Court also ruled that the Act was clearly civil
in nature and was not intended to be punitive. 71
In 1984, Hendricks was convicted of molesting two teenage
boys.72 During the civil commitment trial, Hendricks admitted
to repeatedly molesting various children for over twenty-five

63
64

65

66

67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 356.
See id. at 351·352.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 37l.
See id. at 359·360.
See id. at 369.
Id. at 353.
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years.73
Approximately twenty years before Hendricks'
conviction he had been treated in a psychiatric facility for his
sexual problems until the government considered him safe
enough to be discharged. 74 Soon after Hendricks' release from
the psychiatric facility, he sexually assaulted two young
children and was again sent to prison where he refused to take
part in a treatment course for sex offenders. 75 When Hendricks
was again paroled in 1972, he repeatedly abused his two
stepchildren for the next four years.76 Hendricks also admitted
that he had an uncontrollable urge to molest children and that
the only way to stop him was if he was dead. 77
Hendricks claimed that the Kansas SVPA violated his
substantive due process rights by using the term "mental
abnormality" instead of "mental illness."78 Hendricks also
claimed that the Act violated the prohibition against double
jeopardy and ex post facto principles because it created
criminal rather than civil proceedings that could result in
punishment for behavior for which he had already been
punished. 79 In addition, Hendricks argued that the Act was
punitive because the confinement was indefinite and there was
no legitimate treatment offered. 80
In response to Hendricks' arguments that the use of the
term "mental abnormality" was not equivalent to the term
"mental illness," the United States Supreme Court declared
that the "term 'mental illness' is devoid of any talismanic
significance."81 The Court recognized that legal terminology
regarding issues of mental health varied and were different
from the meanings given to the same terms by the psychiatric
community.82 The United States Supreme Court found that
Kansas' SVPA's use of the term 'mental abnormality' satisfied
substantive due process because the Act further required that

73
74

75
76
77
78

79
80
81
82

See id. at 354.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 354·355.
Id. at 355.
See id. at 358·360.
Id. at 360·361.
See id. at 363·365.
Id. at 358·359.
Id. at 359.
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the mental abnormality contribute to an individual's lack of
control over his or her dangerous behavior. 83
The United States Supreme Court also disagreed with
Hendricks' claim that the Act violated double jeopardy and ex
post facto principles by being criminal in nature. 84 The Court
found that because the Act was in the probate code, not the
criminal code, the Act on its face showed the legislative intent
to be civil and not criminal. 85 In order for Hendricks to negate
this intent, he had to "provideD 'the clearest proof that 'the
statutory scheme [is] ... punitive either in purpose or effect
.... "'86 A civil statute may be found to be a criminal statute if it
embodies certain objectives of criminal law. 87 Two primary
objectives of a criminal law are retribution and deterrence,
neither of which the Untied States Supreme Court found to be
contained in Kansas' SVP Act. 88 The United States Supreme
Court reasoned that the Kansas SVPA was not retributive
because it only used the acts as evidence and not to establish
culpability.89 In addition, the Act did not require a conviction
or evidence of intent in order to confine the person. 90 The Act
was also not meant as a deterrent because it applied to people
who had a hard time controlling their behavior as a result of a
mental abnormality or disorder. 91 Sex offenders who are
unable to control their behavior are not deterred from
committing sex crimes by the possibility of civil commitment. 92

83 Id. at 360. ''The mental health professionals who evaluated Hendricks diagnosed
him as suffering from pedophilia, a condition the psychiatric profession itself classifies
as a serious mental disorder." Id.
84 Id. at 360-361.
85 Id. at 361.
86 See id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248-249 (1980».
87 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963) (lists factors that are important in establishing that an
intended civil sanction is actually criminal, these factors are "[wlhether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution, and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned" ,," Id.).
88 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-362.
89 Id. at 362.
90 See id.
91 Id. at 362-363.
92 See id. at 362-363.
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The United States Supreme Court disagreed with
Hendricks' claim that the Act was punitive. 93 Hendricks'
argued that the Act was punitive because it resulted in
indefinite commitment without guaranteed successful
treatment. 94 The Court found that by being indefinite, the
length of confinement was not motivated by the desire to
punish, but was instead linked to how long the person's mental
abnormality made him or her a threat to society.95 The Court
disagreed that a lack of legitimate treatment made
confinement punitive, because Kansas' "overriding concern" to
protect its citizens from violent sexual predators was not
negated simply because the person might not be cured once
confined. 96 The United States Supreme Court held that
Hendricks had been unable to prove that the Kansas SVPA
was a criminal rather than a civil statute. 97
The Court held that "the Act does not establish criminal
proceedings and ... involuntary confinement pursuant to the
act is not punitive."98 Due to this ruling, Hendricks' claims
that the Act violated double jeopardy and ex post facto
principles necessarily failed. 99 Thus, Kansas v. Hendricks set
the stage for the passage of similar laws in other states.lOO
B. CALIFORNIA LAw

In 1995, the California legislature determined that a small
population of sexually violent predators had a diagnosable
mental disorder and would be a danger to society if released. lol
The legislature determined that these SVP's could be identified
while they were still incarcerated and subjected to civil
Id. at 369.
Id. at 363, 365.
95 Id. at 363.
96
See id. at 365-366.
97
See id. at 361.
98 Id. at 369.
99 Id. Double jeopardy prohibits states from punishing or prosecuting an individual
twice for the same crime. Id. The ex post facto clause only relates to criminal statutes.
Id. at 370. Due to the United States Supreme Court ruling that the Kansas SVPA was
both civil and non punitive, civil commitments under the Act did not violate the double
jeopardy or ex post facto clauses. Id. at 369-371.
100 See Johnson, supra note 34, at 81.
101 See
Stats. 1995, c. 762 § 1 (S.B. 1143) (Cal.), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96Ibilllsenlsb_ll0l1150/sb_1143_bill_951011_chaptered.html (Sept. 11, 1995).
93

9.'f
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commitment until they no longer posed a threat. 102 The
legislature also made clear that SVP's had already served their
criminal sentence and civil commitment was not punitive in
nature but was used for the purpose of treatment. 103
Under California law, a person can be deemed a SVP if
they have "been convicted of a sexually violent offense against
two or more victims and .,. [have] a diagnosed mental disorder
that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of
others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually
violent criminal behavior."lo4 Under the law, a "diagnosed
mental disorder" is one that is either congenital or acquired
and affects the person emotionally and/or volition ally such that
he or she is predisposed to commit criminal sexual acts that
make him or her a danger to others.105 The crimes that are
included in the statute are rape, penetration of genital or anal
openings by foreign object, sodomy, oral copulation, or lewd or
lascivious acts with a child under fourteen with or without
force, violence, duress, menace or fear of injury. 106
Children are vulnerable to both non-violent and violent
repeat felony child molesters.1° 7 Under the law, a child
. molester can be defined as a sexually violent predator if he or
she has engaged in substantial sexual acts against children
younger than fourteen on two or more occasions, even if the
perpetrator did not use force, violence, menace or fear.10 8 A
"substantial sexual contact" consists of "penetration of the
vagina or rectum of either the victim or the offender by the
penis of the other or by any foreign object, oral copulation or
masturbation of either the victim or the offender."109

Id.
Id.
104 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2003).
105 Id. § 6600(c) (West 2003).
106 See id. § 6600(b). "Sexually violent offense" means the following acts ... a felony
violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 261 [rape]. paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 262 [rape of a spouse], Section 264.1 [rape or penetration of
genital or anal openings by foreign object, etc.; acting in concert by force or violence],
subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 [lewd or lascivious acts], or subdivision (a) of
Section 289 [forcible acts of sexual penetration] of the Penal Code, or sodomy or oral
copulation in violation of Section 286 [sodomy] or 288a [oral copulation] of the Penal
Code." Id.
107 People v. Superior Court (Johannes), 70 Cal. App. 4th 558, 568 (1999).
108 Id. at 569.
109 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600.1(b) (West 2003).
102

103
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Under the California Sexually Violent Predator Act, if the
California Department of Corrections determines that one of
their inmates meets the criteria of an SVP, they must refer the
inmate to the California Department of Mental Health at least
six months before his or her release from prison.1 l0 The
Department of Mental Health then assigns two psychologists or
psychiatrists to perform a mental assessment of the inmate.1 11
The standardized assessment must evaluate the inmate for
diagnosable mental disorders and "factors known to be
associated with the risk of reoffense among sex offenders."112
Risk factors "include criminal and psychosexual history, type,
degree, and duration of sexual deviance and severity of mental
disorder."113
If both mental health professionals agree that the person
has a mental disorder that puts him or her at risk for
recidivating, the Department of Mental Health will then
petition the prosecutor of the county in which the person was
convicted to have the person civilly committed,114
The
prosecutor then makes the decision to file a petition with the
court. 115 Mter receiving a petition, the court holds a probable
cause hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the person is a SVP.116 If probable cause exists,
the person then goes to trial where the trier of fact must find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a SVP before he
or she can be civilly committed.1 17
The person who is the subject of the SVP hearing and trial
has the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel and the right
to expert evaluation as well as access to all relevant records. 118
Once a person has been found to be a SVP, he or she must be

1\0 [d. § 6601(a)(1) and (b). The six month requirement is not applicable for inmates
who were received by the department with less than nine months of his or her sentence
to serve, or if the inmate's release date is modified by judicial or administrative action
.... " [d. at (a)(l).
1\1 [d. § 6601(d).
1\2 [d. § 6601(c).
1\3 [d. § 6601(c).
1\4 [d. § 6601(d), (e). If both mental health evaluators do not agree then the Director
of Mental Health retains two independent professionals to give the evaluation. [d.
1\5 [d. § 6601(i).
116 [d. § 6602(a).
117 [d. § 6602(a), § 6604.
118 [d. § 6603(a).
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housed at a designated mental hospital for two years.119 A
SVP's civil commitment is subject to annual review.1 20 Unless
the SVP "affirmatively waivers] his or her right to petition ... "
for release, a hearing to show cause will be held.1 2l The
purpose of the hearing is to decide if "facts exist that warrant a
hearing on whether the person's condition has so changed that
he or she would not be a danger to the health and safety of
others if discharged."l22 If there is probable cause to believe
that he or she is no longer a danger, then the SVP is entitled to
a hearing in which the SVP has the same rights and the
prosecutor has the same burden of proof as in the initial
trial.1 23 If at the hearing the prosecutor cannot show that the
person is still a SVP, then the person must be released
according to the type of petition filed. l24
At the end of the two years of civil commitment the SVP is
entitled to a new civil commitment trial. l25 If the trier of fact
again finds that the person is a SVP, he or she returns to the
mental hospital for another two years. l26 This continues until
the trier of fact finds that the SVP no longer has a mental
disorder that makes him or her a danger to society.1 27
California's SVPA has been constitutionally challenged. l28
In Hubbart v. Superior Court, the court ruled that the SVPA
did not violate due process, equal protection or ex post facto
principles. l29 Hubbart was near the end of his sentence for
breaking into numerous homes, placing a cloth over the lone
female in each home and raping her.l30 He was convicted of
Id. § 6604.
Id. § 6605(a).
121 Id. § 6605(b).
122 Id. § 6605(b).
123 See id. § 6605(c) and (d).
124 Id.; see also id. § 6605(e) (standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for
unconditional release); see also id. § 6608(i) (standard of proof preponderance of the
evidence for conditional release).
125 Id. § 6604.1 (a) and (b).
126 Id.
127 See generally Stats. 1995, c. 762 § 1 (S.B. 1143) (Cal.), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/billlsen/sb_11011150Isb_1143_biIC951011_chaptered.html (Sept. 11, 1995) ("individuals ... found
likely to commit acts of sexually violent criminal behavior ... [should] be confined and
treated until such time that it can be determined that they no longer present a threat
to society.").
128 Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 1138, 1142-1143 (1999).
129 See id. at 1143.
130 See id. at 1149.
119

120
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assaulting six different victims.1 31 Mter being examined by
two mental health professionals as required under California
law, he was diagnosed in part as having "recurrent intense
sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges or behaviors
generally involving ... non-consenting persons" where this
behavior caused "clinically significant distress or impairment ...
[in] important areas of functioning."132 The experts also agreed
that Hubbart presented a high risk for reoffending.1 33
Hubbart claimed that the California SVPA violated his due
process rights because the "definitions of mental impairment
and dangerousness used for commitment ... are flawed ...."134
Hubbart argued that his right to due process was also violated
due to a lack of reputable treatment for sex offenders. 135
Hubbart based his equal protection claim on the fact that the
dangerousness requirement in the SVPA was not as stringent
as in other California civil commitment statutes.1 36 Hubbart
also argued that the SVPA violated the ex post facto clause
because the Act allowed for sexually violent crimes committed
before its enactment to be the basis of civil commitment. 137
In coming to its decision in Hubbart, the California
Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning in Hendricks. 138 The California Supreme Court
rejected Hubbart's claim that the California SVPA's definition
of a "diagnosed mental disorder" was ''broader than what is
constitutionally allowed ...."139 The court reasoned that the

[d. at 1150.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsSOClATION, DlAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, 522·523 (fourth edition, 1994). Actual diagnosis in the case was
"Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified, Bondage, Rape and Sodomy of Adult Women,
Severe .... [and] Personality Disorder, not otherwise specified with antisocial traits."
Hubbart, 19 Cal. 4th at 1150.
133 Hubbart, 19 Cal. 4th at 1150.
134 [d. at 1151·1152.
135 [d. at 1164.
136 [d. at 1168.
137 [d. at 1170.
138 See generally id.at 1138 (the court in Hubbart refers to the United State Supreme
Court's reasoning in Kansas v. Hendricks in making its decisions in regards to
Hubbart).
139 [d. at 1152-1153.
Diagnosed mental disorder includes any "congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the
person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a
menace to the health and safety of others." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(c} (West
2003).
131

132
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differences between the terms "mental disorder" and "mental
illness" were "purely semantical [sic]."14o
Contrary to Hubbart's claim that the SVPA necessarily
included persons who were only remotely harmful, the
California Supreme Court found that the Act actually required
a finding that the "SVP is dangerous at the time of
commitment."141 The court also referred to Hendricks when
rejecting Hubbart's claims that his due process rights were
violated because there was no viable treatment.142 The court
noted that there was no constitutional right to treatment for
people who are involuntarily committed.1 43
The California Supreme Court disagreed with Hubbart's
claim that the California SVPA commitment criteria regarding
dangerousness was less stringent than other civil commitment
statutes, such that it violated his equal protection rights. 144
The court pointed out that Hubbart's equal protection attack
was identical to his unsuccessful due process argument that
the SVPA failed to require a "present dangerousness."145
Finally, the California Supreme Court rejected Hubbart's
assertion that the SVPA violated the ex post facto clause.1 46
The ex post facto clause only concerns laws, which
"retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the
punishment for criminal acts."147 The court reasoned that the
California SVPA pertained only to a civil proceeding, not
criminal and thus the confinement was not punishment. 148

C.

DANGEROUSNESS

In Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, the United
States Supreme Court stated that, "[p]redictions of dangerous
behavior, no matter who makes them, are incredibly
inaccurate, ... psychiatrists are not uniquely qualified to

140
141

142
143
144
145

146
147
148

Id. at 1157.
See id. at 1161·1163.
Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1166.
See id. at 1168·1170.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1170·1171 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1170·1172.
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predict dangerous behavior .... "149 The Court, however, has also
stated that, "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a
prediction of future criminal conduct."150 In other words,
although the Court recognizes that predicting future
dangerousness is not an exact science, the Court also realizes
that such predictions play an important role for the trier of fact
in certain cases.
California courts have also acknowledged that
psychiatrists and psychologists cannot accurately diagnose an
illness in every case, let alone predict the risk of future
dangerousness of an individual. 151 Despite the lack of
predictability of dangerousness and the loss of liberty that
occurs from civil commitment, the California Supreme Court
decided in People v. Burnick that using a reasonable doubt
standard "is not negated by the 'predictive' content of the
ultimate finding."152 In other words, the risks involved in
predicting future dangerousness in civil commitment
proceedings can be reduced by a reasonable doubt standard. 153
In 1980, under California's Mentally Disordered Sex
Offender (MDSO) statute, a California Appellate Court in
People v. Henderson faced the problems inherent in predicting
future dangerousness. 154 Future dangerousness has been
defined as the existence of "present proclivities" that, if given
the right stimulus and situation, could result in behavior that
is dangerous to others.155 The Henderson court cautioned
against interpreting the requirement of future dangerousness
as being absolute before civilly committing a person under the
Act by stating, "the very real statistical possibility that the
prediction may never be fulfilled does not detract from the
validity of the expert's opinion as to the present threat of
substantial harm posed by the defendant."156 The mental
health expert who completed the assessment merely gave his

Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 364-365 n.2 (1972).
Schall v. Martin, 467 US 253, 278 (1984).
151
See People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d. 306, 365·326 (1975).
152 See id. at 327-328.
153 See id.
154
See generally People v. Henderson, 107 Cal. App. 3d 475 (1980) (discussed the
application of risk assessments to the MDSO).
155 [d. at 484.
156 [d. (emphasis added).
149

150
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opinion as to future dangerousness; it was up to the trier of fact
to decide how much weight to give the prediction. 157
California has recently faced similar issues under the
SVPA.158 Patrick Ghilotti was committed under the SVPA in
1998 because he had been found to be a sexually violent
predator.1 59 In November of 2001, the Marin County District
Attorney filed a petition for recommitment. 160 The Director of
Mental Health requested the petition despite the fact that the
two mental health professionals who evaluated Ghilotti felt he
no longer met the criteria for civil commitment. 161 The district
attorney argued that the director should be able to disregard
the evaluations when the director believes that the person is
still a SVP.1 62 The California Supreme Court disagreed,
finding that the Act did not permit the filing of a petition
unless two mental health professionals agreed that the person
was a SVP. 163
The court also found, however, that if the conclusions of
the mental health professionals were based on legal error, then
the evaluations were invalid.l 64 "[AJn evaluator applying this
standard must conclude that the person is 'likely' to reoffend,
if, because of a current mental disorder ... the person presents
a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk
that he or she will commit such crimes if free in the
community."165 The court defined the term "likely" as meaning
more than a "mere possibility," but this possibility did not have
to be "better than even."166 In other words, the evaluator did
See id. at 485·486.
See generally People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 27 Cal. 4th 888, 896 (2002)
(discusses the level of risk needed for a mental evaluator to recommend an individual
for commitment or recommitment).
159 Id. at 896.
160 Id. at 895. Although Ghilotti's first two year term was up in 2000, at a hearing
for recommitment he stipulated to extending his term for another year. Id. at 896.
161
Id. at 893·894.
162 Id. at 894.
163 Id.' at 894·895.
164 Id. at 895. "The recommendation of an evaluator is subject to judicial review for
such material legal error at the behest of the appropriate party. If ... the court finds no
material legal error on the face of the report, ... the evaluator's recommendation [will
be] valid .... If the court finds material legal error on the face of the report, it shall
direct .. , the erring evaluator [to] prepare a new or corrected report applying correct
legal standards." Id.
165 Id. at 922.
166 See id.
"If both evaluators concur that the person has a diagnosed mental
disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without
157

158
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not have to conclude that there was more than a fifty percent
chance that the person would commit another sexually violent
act to find that the person fit the criteria for civil
commitment. 167
Although the evaluators do not have to decide that the risk
the person poses to society is greater than chance, they do have
to be aware of the problems involved in predicting future
dangerousness. 16B
In addressing the inaccuracy of such
predictions the court reasoned that, these predictions are made
at the "initial screening stage" to decide if the offender meets
the civil commitment requirements under the SVPA.169 It is
still up to the trier of fact. to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the offender is an SVP.170

II. ANALYSIS
A.

PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS

"[S]exual violence is actual, attempted or threatened sexual
contact with a person who is nonconsenting or unable to give
consent."l71 There has been a mounting apprehension about
the ability to predict dangerous behavior, especially as it
pertains to civil commitment. 172 While it is true that the
predictions in SVP cases cannot be made with a 100% surety,
the problem with SVP laws is that not enough sexual
offenders are even being evaluated. 173

In order to understand how many child molesters are not
mentally evaluated, it is useful to know how many child
molesters actually reoffend. When studying recidivism risk as
it pertains to the SVPA, the issue is determining "the rate that
previously convicted sex offenders recommit the types of
appropriate treatment and custody .... " CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(d) (West
2003).
167 See People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), 27 Cal. 4th at 922.
168 See id. at 921·922.
169 See id. at 921·922.
170 Id. at 922.
171
Boer et. at, supra note 15, at 328.
172 George E. Dix, Determining the Continued Dangerousness of Psychologically
Abnormal Sex Offenders, 3 J. PSYCHIATRY L. 327, 327 (1975).
173 See generally Doren, supra note 16, at 98 (describes base rates in general and
points out how the true base rate of sexual predators are not known).
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behavior [the] law portrays as sexually predatory .... "174 There
are several problems with the research on the base rate of
recidivism of child molesters.175 One methodological problem
with the research studies about recidivism rates of child
molesters is that a majority of studies use reconviction as
evidence of recidivism. 176 The SVPA defines risk as how likely
the person is to commit a future "sexually predatory act," so the
use of reconviction rates underestimates the true base rate of
recidivism.177 For example, when using data other than just
convictions, such as rearrests, probation, parole and self-report,
studies have shown a 27% - 47% increase in sexual
recidivism. 178
Using conviction data also poses a problem when trying to
determine how active a given SVP has beenY9 "[I]ndex
offense[s] and known criminal convictions at the time of
admission are very poor indicators of the extent of an
individual's actual deviant sexual behavior."18o Asking child
molesters about their past deviant behavior may result in an
underestimation of the true number of victims. 18l These people
are reluctant to admit past deviant behavior, which makes
such research difficult. 182
The recidivism rate can also depend on methodology such
as the length of time the child molester is tracked after release
from custody.1 83 The SVPA takes into account any qualifying
sex crimes that are committed during the perpetrator's
lifetime. 184 Although research studies have varied in their

Id.
Id. at 99.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 100.
178 Id. at 99.
179 See e.g. A. Nicholas Groth, Robert E. Long & J. Bradley McFadin, Undetected
Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 453 (1982).
180 Lea H. Studer, Steven R. Clelland, A. Scott Aylwin, John R. Reddon & Audrine
Monro, Rethinking Risk Assessment for Incest Offenders, 23 INT'L. J. L. PSYCHIATRY 15,
19 (2000).
181
See Groth et. a!., supra note 179, at 456.
182 Studer et. a!., supra note 180, at 19. See generally Groth et. a!. supra note 179, at
450 (study illustrates that an average of 4.7 offenses go undetected when official
records are used).
183 Vernon L. Quinsey, Martin L. Lalumiere, Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris,
Predicting Sexual Offenses, in AsSESSING DANGEROUSNESS: VIOLENCE BY SEXUAL
OFFENDERS, BATTERERS AND CHILD ABUSERS 116 (J.C. Campell ed., 1995).
184
See Doren, supra note 16, at 100.
174
175
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length of follow-up periods, no study's duration has been
conducted for the life of the perpetrator.1 85 Not all repeat
offenders will be caught during the time period specified by the
research. 186 Thus, they are labeled as non-recidivists when
they are actually unknown recidivists. 187 In addition, most
recidivism studies concentrate solely on static variables
(unchanging variables such as marital status and prior
offenses) instead of dynamic factors, which help to classify each
individual offender as being dangerous.1 88
Prentky et. al (1997) conducted a 25-year follow-up study
where the researchers defined recidivism as a new charge,
conviction or imprisonment. 189 They used multiple sources and
took into account how long each offender was actually free
during the follow-up period.1 90 Out of 115 child molesters, 52%
committed another sexual offense.1 91 Through the addition of
new charges to the definition of recidivism (as opposed to only
new convictions), the recidivism rate for child molesters
increased by 11 %.192 When taking into account the amount of
time that the offender was actually free (exposure time), as
opposed to using the "simple percentage" of offenders who were
charged at some point during the 25 years, there was a 20%
increase in recidivism. 193 In order to better understand the
recidivism base rate of sexual offenders in a manner that is
useful to the SVPA, studies should consist oflifelong follow-ups
and both static and dynamic factors of recidivism.
See id.
See id.
187 See id.
188 See R. Karl Hansen, Richard A. Steffy & Rene Gauthier, Long·Term Recidivism
of Child Molesters, 61 J. CONSULTING CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 646, 646 (1993).
189 Robert A. Prentky, Austin F.S. Lee, Raymond A. Knight & David Cerce,
Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A Methodological Analysis, 21
LAw HUM. BEHAV. 635, 637, (1997). Although the follow-up period was 25 years, the
average amount of time between release date and new offense was 3.64 years. Id at
185
186

643.

See id. at 637.
See id. at 650-651.
192 See id. at 644.
193 See id. at 643. Researchers calculated both the "simple proportion of individuals
known to have reoffended during the study period" as well as the "failure rate" (FR).
Id. at 641. FR was defined as the "proportion of individuals who reoffended ... [when]
tak[ing] into account the amount of time each offender [had] been on the street and
thus able to reoffend." Id. For child molesters, the simple proportion of new sexual
offenses was 32% while the FR for sexual offenses was 52% with a difference of 20%.
Id. at 643.
190
191
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In California, there are about 96,162 convicted sex
offenders, of which 70% are child molesters.194 Only 1% of
California's sex offenders are actually committed as SVP'S.195
Between the years 1998 and 2001, there have been 11,154
admissions to the prison system for felony sex crimes which
include rape, lewd acts with a child, oral copulation, sodomy,
penetration with an object and other sex offenses. 196 As of Dec
31, 2000, there were a total of 12,017 felony sex offenders in
the California prison system, and an additional 5,538 under
supervision of the parole board. 197 Since 1996 only 4,682 of the
convicted sex offenders in California have been referred to the
Department of Mental Health (DMH).198 Of these 4,682, only
404 have been civilly committed.l 99 Using the numbers above
it is obvious that the low percentage of civilly committed sex
offenders is not the result a mental evaluation finding that the
offender is not dangerous, but is the result of the offender not
meeting the criteria to be mentally evaluated in the first place.

B. PROBLEMS WITH THE CALIFORNIA SVPA
Under the SVPA, the California Department of Corrections
(CDC) screens each child molester to determine if he or she is a
potential sexually violent predator. 2oo The CDC determines
whether child molesters are potential SVPs based on qualifying
crimes (rape, penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign
object, sodomy, oral copulation, or lewd or lascivious acts with
a child under 14 with or without force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of injury) and/or whether convictions were

194 Julian Guthrie, Care or Jail for Molesters? Mental Health, Victims'Rights Groups
Sharply Split, S.V. CHRON. Sept. 4, 2002 at A4.
195 Id.
196 See California Department of Corrections,
www.cdc.state.ca.uslOffenderlnfoServiceslReportslAnnuaIlArchive.asp. 2,785 in 1998,
2,767 in 1999, 2,784 in 2000, and 2,818 in 2001. Id.
197 Id.
198 See California Department of Mental Health, www.dmh.calsocp. (Facts '~nd
Figures), (2/03/03).
199 Id.
Of the 4,682 offenders referred to DMH, 2,567 have met the criteria for a
mental evaluation. Id. Of the 2,567, 1,076 have had a positive clinical evaluation,
1,453 have had a negative clinical evaluation and 38 have a pending evaluation. Id.
Of the 1,076 positive evaluations, 160 were rejected by the District Attorney, 138
lacked probable cause and 404 have been civilly committed. Id.
200 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(a)(I) (West 2003).
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against two different victims. 201 Child molesters who meet the
screening criteria are referred to the Department of Mental
Health for a mental evaluation. 202

1. Convictions
Prosecutors have sole discretion regarding decisions to
prosecute and what charges to file. 203 Prosecutors at times
"avoid uncertainty" by pursuing cases where a conviction is
highly probable and refusing cases were a conviction is
doubtful. 204 Most of the relevant sex crimes are listed in the
Act, but incest205 and continuous sexual abuse of a child206 are
not. 207 As long as these latter crimes are not listed, prosecutors
need to be aware of their exclusion and make decisions
regarding charges accordingly. If the prosecutor charges a
defendant with either one of these crimes, the defendant may
not be eligible for a mental evaluation under the SVPA even if
he or she is a sexually violent predator.
a. Incest: 208
The law defines incest as "[p]ersons being within the
degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared
by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each
other, or who commit fornication or adultery with each other,
are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison."209 There
is a logical reason why incest is not included as an offense that
would qualify a person as a potential SVP. Incest can occur
between two consenting adults while the SVPA protects society

201 CDC Department Operations Manual 6.2130.8,
http://www.cdc.state.ca.uslRegulations
PolicieslPDFIDOMlOO_dept_ops_manual.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2003).
202 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(b) (West 2003).
203 See Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison

of Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and
Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 652 (2001).
204 Id.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 2003).
Id. § 288.5.
207
See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600.1 (West 2003) (California Penal
Code sections 288 and 288.5 are not listed as qualifying offenses).
208
CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 2003).
209 Id. § 285.
205
206
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from sex offenders who are predatory and violent, not from
people who commit any sex crime.
Although excluding incest as a listed crime in the SVPA is
rational, prosecutors need to keep its exclusion in mind when
charging child molesters who molest family members. If the
child molester is only convicted of the crime of incest, he or she
cannot be evaluated as a possible SVP even if every other
criterion is met and the offender is potentially dangerous.
Prosecutors may want to consider charging child molestation
that occurs between family members as one of the listed crimes
rather than solely as incest. For example, under the California
Penal Code, lewd and lascivious conduct21O is considered to be a
separate crime from incest such that a defendant can be
convicted of both incest and lewd and lascivious conduct for the
same acts. 211 Prosecutors may thus add an additional charge of
lewd and lascivious conduct to any charge of incest against a
child so that the defendant convicted of lewd and lascivious
conduct can be subject to a mental evaluation under the SVPA.
b. Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child: 212
The crime of continuous sexual abuse of a child occurs
when anyone who either resides with or has repeated access to
a child under fourteen years of age engages in three or more
acts of "substantial sexual conduct" over at least a three month
period with that child. 213 "Substantial sexual conduct means
penetration of the vagina or rectum of either the victim or the
offender by the penis or by any foreign object, oral copulation,
or masturbation of either the victim or the offender."214
Defendants found guilty of this offense "shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 6, 12, or 16
210 Id. § 288. "Any person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious
act ... " including rape, penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign object, sodomy
or oral copulation on a "child who is under 14 years, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the
child ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight
years." Id. at § 288(a).
211
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (WEST 2003); see People v. McMee, 82 Cal. App. 389, 393,
405 (2002). Lewd and lascivious conduct is a separate crime from incest under
California Penal Code § 288. Id.
212 CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5 (West 2003).
213 Id. § 288.5(a).
214 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(b) (West 2003).
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years."215 Due to the continuous nature of the abuse required
for a charge of continuous sexual abuse of a child, a majority of
those who are charged are likely to be "resident child
molesters."216
Family members that abuse children exploit the child's
innocence, naIvete and the child's inclination to be deferential
to adults. 217 Children learn from a young age that they need to
rely on their family for care and safety.218 A family member
that continuously molests a child has ample time to groom
and/or threaten the child to ensure that any abuse is not
resisted or disclosed to third parties. 219 Not only can the
abuser threaten to hurt the child or another family member if
the child tells, but they can threaten the child with the
breakup of the family and the possibility that the child will
have to live with strangers. 220 The coercion by the parent
offender coupled with the guilt felt by the child victim often
keeps the child silent, which allows the abuse to be ongoing. 221
Family child abusers are not only a danger to their own
family but to children outside the family as well. 222 The
conventional wisdom among professionals dealing with these
issues is that incest offenders are at a lower risk to reoffend
and that their sex offenses are "limited to family members."223
This belief, however, is not the case. 224 In one study, 88 of 150
(58.7%) incestuous offenders admitted to having nonincestuous
victims. 225 In addition, 53.3% of the fathers with biological
victims also admitted to nonincestuous victims. 226 Of the 178
sex offenders who had been convicted of a sex offense involving
Id. § 288.5(a).
See Stats. 1989, c. 1402, § l(a) (Cal.).
217 See Cory Jewell Jensen, Patti Bailey & Steve Jensen, Selection, Engagement and
Seduction of Children and Adults by Child Molesters, 36·DEC PROSECUTOR 20, 43
(2002).
218 See id.
219 See generally Patrick Parkinson, Family Law and Parent-Child Contact:
Assessing the Risk of Sexual Abuse, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 345, 363-364 (1999) (discusses
types of grooming and how sex offenders keep children silent about the abuse).
220 See Jenson, supra note 217, at 45.
221
See id.
222 See Studer, supra note 180, at 18-19.
223 Id at 16.
224 See generally id. at 18-19 (provides research findings indicating that some incest
offenders molest children outside of their family).
225 Id. at 18.
226 Id. at 19.
215

216
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a nonbiological victim, 12.9% had been convicted of, or
admitted to having committed, an incestuous sex offense. 227
Familial offenders are predators and will not stop
molesting children just because family members are
inaccessible. 228 Sex offenders who have abused their own
family members need to be evaluated to assess their potential
dangerousness to other children. By not allowing convictions
for continuous sexual abuse of a child to count toward the
criteria required for a SVP mental evaluation, the Act allows
certain sexually violent child molesters to be free to either
continue to molest their own family members or to find new
victims outside of the family.
'
On August 31, 2000, the California legislature attempted
to close this loophole in the SVPA. 229 The Legislature passed a
bill that allowed for the inclusion of California Penal Code
section 288.5 in the SVPA.230 Governor Gray Davis vetoed this
bill on September 29, 2000, stating that "[e]xpanding the
definition of SVP would increase the number of SVP patients
treated by the Department of Mental Health and civilly
committed by counties" and would result in increased costS. 231
Governor Davis also stated that the California Department of
Corrections was beginning a more intensive supervision and
treatment program for "sex offender parolees that are deemed
to be a high risk to re-offend."232
Governor Davis' reasoning that including continuous
sexual abuse of a child in the SVPA would make the Act too
broad is not in line with the goal of the Act. 233 The Act is
[d. at 18-19.
See generally id. at 15 (provides research findings indicating that some incest
offenders molest children outside of their family).
229 See generally AB. 1458, (2000) (Cal.) (bill analysis),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00Ibilllasmlab_14511500/ab_1458_biIC20000831_enrolled.html (Aug 31, 2000) (the assembly included
continuous sexual abuse of a child in this bill, which was ultimately vetoed). Within the
bill analysis the legislature noted that 219 people had been convicted of continuous
sexual abuse of a child in 1997-1998. [d.
230 AB. 1458, (2000) (Cal.), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00Ibilllasmlab_14511500/ab_1458_bill_20000831_enrolled.html (Aug 31, 2000) (this bill was ultimately
vetoed).
231 AB. 1458, (2000) (Cal.), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00Ibilllasmlab_14511500/ab_1458_vt_20000929.html (Sept. 29, 2000) (Governor's veto).
232 [d.
233 See generally Stats. 1995, c. 762 § 1 (S.B. 1143) (Cal.),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96Ibilllsenlsb_ll0 1227

228
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intended to protect society from repeat sex offenders who will
continue to be a danger to society if they are free. 234 Under the
Act, the offender must be convicted of one of the enumerated
crimes against two separate victims before they are eligible for
a mental evaluation. 235 Including another crime that consists
of sexual abuse of a child does not create a situation where
more offenders will be automatically committed, but instead
creates a situation where more potentially dangerous offenders
will be evaluated for their potential dangerousness. By not
allowing the inclusion of continuous sexual abuse of a child,
Governor Davis is permitting the continuation of an existing
loophole in the Act and perpetuating the inability of the Act to
protect society as intended by the legislature. In addition, the
California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Johnson has
created an even bigger loophole by not allowing a defendant to
be convicted of both lewd and lascivious conduct and
continuous sexual abuse of a child in regards to the same act. 23G
Under California Penal code section 288.5 (c), when a
defendant is charged under section 288.5, he or she cannot also
be charged "in the same proceeding with a charge under this
section unless the other charged offense ... " refers to offenses
outside of the time period charged under section 288.5 or "the
other offense is charged in the alternative."237 Until recently,
the California courts have followed People v. Valdez by
interpreting this to mean that the defendant could be charged
and convicted of both section 288 and section 288.5 when the
charges pertained to the same acts, but that the defendant
could not be punished for both convictions. 238 In other words,
the defendant's record would reflect a conviction for both
crimes, but his prison time could only be calculated based on
one of the convictions. 239 In the summer of 2002, the California
Supreme Court m People v. Johnson overruled this
1150/sb_1143_biIL951011_chaptered.html (Sept. 11, 1995) (the goal of the statute is to
civilly commit sexually violent predators that are dangerous to the public).
234
See id.
235
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) & § 6601(b) (West 2003).
236 See People v. Johnson, 28 Cal. 4th 240, 246 (2002).
237
CAL PENAL CODE § 288.5(c) (West 2003).
238 See People v. Valdez, 23 Cal.App.4th 46, 48·49 (1994). Under this interpretation,
the prosecutor could charge the defendant under both California Penal Code sections
288 and 288.5 and if the defendant was convicted of both then there would be a
conviction that was listed under the SVPA.
239 See id.
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interpretation of Penal Code section 288.5(c) and instead
interpreted the code to mean that the prosecutor could charge
the defendant under both Penal Code section 288 and section
288.5 for the same acts, but that the defendant could not be
convicted of both crimes. 24o
As long as the SVPA excludes the crime of continuous
sexual abuse of a child, prosecutors need to be cautious when
charging a defendant with this crime. If the prosecutor charges
the defendant with both continuous sexual abuse of a child and
lewd and lascivious conduct for the same acts, one of two things
could happen. The trier of fact has the option to convict the
defendant of either continuous sexual abuse of a child or lewd
and lascivious conduct, but not both. If the defendant were
convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child he or she would
be subjected to a longer prison sentence but would not be
classified as a SVP. If, however, the defendant were convicted
of lewd and lascivious conduct, he or she would receive a
lighter prison sentence but would be classified as a SVP.
Before bringing charges under Penal Code section 288.5 and
section 288 (that refer to the same acts), prosecutors should
keep in mind that a conviction of continuous sexual abuse of a
child does not qualify as a conviction that would result in the
offender being labeled as a SVP. By vetoing the proposed
amendment to include this crime in the Act, Governor Davis
has created a situation where prosecutors must carefully
choose their charges if they intend to prevent dangerous
molesters from being released.
c. Juvenile Court:
In certain cases the prosecutor can decide to have the case
tried solely in the juvenile courts.241 Although the proceedings
in juvenile court provide protection to the child, they do not

See People v. Johnson, 28 Cal. 4th at 246.
See BILLIE WRIGHT DZIECH & JUDGE CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL:
AMERICA'S COURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 39 (Beacon
Books, 1991). The sexual abuse of a child can be dealt with in the juvenile court
system when a "parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from
sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that
the child was in danger of sexual abuse." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) (West
2003).
240

241
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result in a conviction or punishment for the perpetrator. 242 The
judge in juvenile court has substantial discretion when
deciding how best to deal with a case once he or she has
decided that the child was sexually abused,243 but without a
conviction the perpetrator is not susceptible to the SVPA.244
There are situations where deciding not to criminally
prosecute the abuser is beneficial for the child, such as when
the child is too young, the evidence is weak or a criminal trial
could further traumatize the child. 245 In juvenile court, the
child does not have to testify246 and the standard of proof is
lower than the standard required in criminal court.247
Prosecutors, however, need to be cautious when deciding to
take a case to juvenile court but not criminal court; even very
young children can give effective testimony if they are
adequately prepared. 248 In addition, testifying in court can be
therapeutic for children who can feel a sense of empowerment
and realize that adults take them seriously.249 Prosecutors
should avoid bringing child molestation cases solely to juvenile
court when there is a good possibility of a guilty verdict in
criminal court without trauma to the child.

2. Number of Victims
Under the SVPA, a child molester must be convicted of sex
crimes involving more than one victim in order to be classified
as a SVP.250 This requirement was arguably created under the
theory that more than one victim is evidence of predatory
behavior.251 There are two situations where this can become a
See In re Alysha, 51 Cal. App. 4th 393, 397 (1996).
See In re Corey, 227 Cal. App. 3d 339, 345-346 (1991).
244
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2003).
245 See Lucy Berliner & Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of
Sexual Assault, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 125, 134-135 (1984).
246 See In re Kailee B., 18 Cal. App. 4th 719,725-726 (1993).
247 See Dziech, supra note 242, at 39.
248
Berliner, supra note 245, at 129.
249 [d. at 135.
250 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 2003).
251
See generally Assembly Committee on Public Safety, S.B.X1 41, Comments §
4(a)(i) (Cal. 1994) available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94Ibilllsenlsb_000l0050/sbx1_41_bilC940623_amended_sen (June 23, 2994) (this proposed Bill was never
242
243

passed) (the California Legislature when first attempting to create a SVPA in 1994
discussed introducing the requirement that the offender must have been convicted of
more than one sexually violent crime by asking "[s]hould a sexually violent predator by
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problem. The first situation is when there is actually one
victim. The second situation is where there are multiple
victims but the child molester was only convicted of crimes
against one of the victims.
a. Conviction for Only One Actual Victim:
The first situation occurs during the screening process by
the CDC, at which time the child molester's record shows that
his or her crime(s) involved only one victim. The legislature
has decided that mental health professionals do not need to
evaluate this child molester for future dangerousness, even
though the research shows that there is a 52% chance that he
or she may eventually reoffend. 252 In other words, another
child, and possibly more, must suffer before this child molester
is evaluated for his or her risk of future dangerousness.
If the legislature has faith in mental health professionals,
what makes a professional's ability to predict any different
when the sex offender has victimized only one victim rather
than two? The evaluator should use multiple reliable and valid
methods of assessing future risk that combines both statistical
and clinical methods. 253 These methods need to use multiple
sources of information, including both static and dynamic
factors that tap multiple domains of functioning. 254 When
using previous crimes as part of the assessment, the severity
and/or the duration of the abuse as well as the presence of nonsexual crimes may be more important indicators of future
dangerousness than the fact that two victims have been
identified. 255 As discussed below the evaluations of potential
definition commit more than one crime?" Id.).
252
Prentky et. aI., supra note 189, at 643.
253 See Joel S. Milner & Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Prediction Issues for Practitioners,
in AsSESSING DANGEROUSNESS: VIOLENCE BY SEXUAL OFFENDERS, BATTERERS AND
CHILD ABUSERS 21·22 (J.C. Cambell ed., 1995). The clinical method uses experience
and observation of the researcher and the statistical method is based on "how others
have acted in similar situations (actuarial) or on an individual's similarity to members
of violent groups." Id. at 21.
254
Boer et. aI., supra note 15, at 329, Table 17.1.
255 See generally CONREP Policy and Procedure Manual, Clinical Evaluation:
Assessment Services § 1610.15 (March, 2002),
http://www .dmh.cahwnet.gov/SpeciaIPrograms/Forensic/docs/voll
chap1600/1610(9·02R4).pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2003) (this is evidenced by the fact
that the tests used by CONREP focus more on behavioral characteristics of the
offender than on the number of victims). The tests used are the Minnesota Mutiphasic
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SVPs consist of multiple reliable and valid sources of
information on many areas of functioning. 256
The statistical or actuarial method is helpful because
"particular samples of sex offenders vary widely in their
recidivism rates .... [So] actuarial scale[s] would be successful in
ranking child molesters and rapists from samples with
different characteristics according to ... risk."257 A good
actuarial instrument includes static factors such as history of
offenses, psychopathy and "phallometrically measured sexual
preferences," as well as dynamic factors such as "gaining or
losing employment. . .. changes in attitude or mood.
treatment induced changes '" [and] the opportunity to commit
further offenses .... "258 In the end, the strategy of risk
assessment should be to "anchor clinical judgment ... start with
an actuarial estimate of risk and then to alter it by examining
dynamic variables such as treatment outcome and intensity
and quality of supervision."259 The SVP evaluator needs to use
actuarial instruments that require different types of
information and then supplement this with relevant dynamic
factors in order to create a comprehensive assessment of an
individual's future dangerousness.
In California, the Conditional Release Program
("CONREP") conducts clinical evaluations of potential SVPS.260
CONREP defines assessment as "a comprehensive, mental
health clinical evaluation of the etiology, course, and/or current
status of the patient's mental, emotional or behavioral
disorder."261 The assessment that is used on SVPs consists of

Personality Inventory·2 (MMPI·2), Rorchach, HCR·20, Hare Psychopathy Checklist,
and the Mutliphasic Sex Inventory (MSI). Id. at § 1610.15.
256 See generally CONREP Policy and Procedure Manual, Clinical Evaluation:
Assessment Services (March, 2002),
http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/SpecialPrograms/Forensic/docs/v011
chap1600/1610(9.02R4).pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2003) (gives the different assessments
that CONREP provides and what each one assesses).
257
Quinsey et. al., supra note 183, at 132.
258 Id. at 132·133.
259 Id. at 132.
260 See generally CONREP Policy and Procedure Manual, Clinical Evaluation:
Assessment Services §1610.6 (March, 2002),
http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/SpecialPrograms/Forensic/docs/vol1
chap1600/1610(9·02R4).pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2003) (gives the different assessments
that CONREP provides and what each one assesses).
261 Id. § 1610.1.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

31

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 7

326

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

both a Behavioral and Psychiatric Functioning Questionnaire
("BPFQ")262 and Standardized Psychological Testing. 263
The BPFQ is a "multi-part behavioral checklist ... " that
"describes the range of social, behavioral, and psychiatric
"264
It
measures
such
things
as
problems
"employment/employability; living arrangement; social support;
substance abuse; overall adherence to treatment program;
behavioral obtrusiveness; self-confidence; and psychiatric
symptomatology using the Forensic Adaptation of the Brief
This particular
Psychiatric Rating Scale ("FBPRS")."265
assessment takes into account many areas of functioning both
present and future. 266 The standard assessment used by
CONREP also includes the Standardized Psychological Testing
protocol, which is a more in-depth evaluation. 267
The Standardized Psychological Testing protocol addresses
functioning of "physical co-factors; intellectual functioning;
neuropsychological functioning;
risk assessment;
and
competency assessment (as appropriate)."268
Physical cofactors "determineD the presence and degree to which physical
disorders are co-factors to a patient's mental disorder" while
tests of intellectual functioning indicate the patient's capacity
to take part in therapy.269 Neuropsychological functioning is
tested using both the Neurobehavioral Cognitive Screening
Examine (NCSE) and the Trails Making A & B to "help identify
the areas and severity of impairment and establish the need for
further neuropsychological testing."270
Testing the basic
neurological functioning of potential SVPs is important to
detect possible neurological problems that could effect overall
assessment and possible treatment. 271
The most important part of the Standardized Psychological
Testing, when the subject is a possible SVP, is the Risk

[d. § 1610.10-1610.11.
[d. § 1610.12-1610.15.
264 [d. § 1610.10.
265 [d. § 1610.10-1610.11.
266
See generally id. (the listed areas that are measured are both present and future).
267
See generally id. § 1610.12-1610.22 (this assessment covers cognitive factors as
well as risk assessment).
268 [d. § 1610.12.
269 [d. § 1610.13.
270 [d. § 1610.14.
262
263

271

[d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/7

32

Yell: CA Sexually Violent Predator Act

2003]

CA. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT

327

Assessment. 272 The Risk Assessment consists of several tests
as well as "other clinical indicators such as psycho-social
history, patient compliance with treatment progress in meeting
treatment goals and monitoring behavior through supervision
.... "273 The battery of tests that are used include the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 MMPI-2, Rorschach
Comprehensive System (Exner), HCR-20 (behavioral measure),
Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) and/or the Hare
Psychopathy Checklist Short Version (PCL-SV), and the
Multiphasic Sex Inventory (MSI).274
The process used by CONREP follows the suggestions of
the research concerning what information is relevant and how
to go about obtaining the information. CONREP's assessment
utilizes numerous methods and sources to gather relevant
information on different domains of functioning. CONREP
uses both statistical (actuarial) methods (as listed above) and
the examination of dynamic goals (as listed above) to complete
the assessment of a potential SVP.
The assessment procedure that CONREP uses to predict
the future dangerousness of child molesters is adequate: there
is no indication that information gleaned from sex crime
conviction(s) involving two victims increases the accuracy of
the assessment over information gleaned from a conviction
involving one victim. Even in situations where a child molester
convicted of a sex crime involving one child clearly admits that
he or she intends to continue molesting children, under the
present SVPA there is nothing that law enforcement can do
once their prison sentence has been served. If the same child
molester had been convicted of sex crimes involving more than
one child, at the end of his or her prison sentence, he or she can
be referred for an assessment of future dangerousness. The
number of identifiable victims should not be as important as
the actual danger a child molester poses to our children.
b. Conviction on Only One of Multiple Victims:
The second situation that arises concerning the
requirement of two victims exists when evidence points to

273

See id.
Id. §161O;15.

274

[d.

272
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multiple victims, but the molester is charged with crimes
pertaining to only one victim.
The problem with the
requirement of a conviction involving two different victims
becomes more apparent when considering the fact that only a
small percentage of sex crimes committed against children
even come to the attention of the authorities. 275 This increases
the existence of situations where a conviction is obtained in
regard to one victim when in reality there are multiple victims.
An estimated 6% of sex crimes against children are
reported to the authorities. 276
When reports of child
molestations are made, children under the age of 12 make up a
third (34%) of reported victims of sex crimes and constitute
more than half of all juvenile victims (under 18).277 One out of
every seven victims (14%) of a sex crime is under the age of six
with 69% of victims under six being female. 278 Of any age,
males are most at risk of being sexually abused at four-yearsold, however, they are still only half as likely to be victimized
as females at the same age. 279 When a child under six has been
sexually abused and the abuse has been reported to
authorities, an arrest is made only 19% of the time. 280 Children
aged 6-11 do not fare much better, with only 33% of their
perpetrators being arrested when their abuse is reported. 281
Hypothetically,282 if in any year there are reports of 10,000
victims of sex assault, 1,400 are under six-years-old, and 966 of
these children are female. Another 3,400 of these reported
victims are children aged 6-11. There is also an additional
75,200 children whose sexual abuse is not reported. Only 466
of the 1,400 children under six who are victims of reported
sexual assault, and 1,122 of the 3,400 6-11 year-oIds will see
their abuser arrested. Once the abuser is arrested it is up to
the prosecutor whether or not to bring criminal charges.
Looking at the above numbers, it is poignantly clear how few
See Prager, supra note 1, at 62.
Id.
277
Howard N. Snyder, Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to Law
Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics. BUREAU JUST. STAT. REP.
NCJ 182990, 2 (July, 2000) Table 1.
278 Id. at 2, 4.
279 Id. at 4.
280 Id at 11.
281
Id.
282
These numbers are meant to illustrate the percentages given and are not derived
from any source.
275

276

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/7

34

Yell: CA Sexually Violent Predator Act

2003]

CA. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT

329

children who are sexually abused even have their case looked
at by a prosecutor.
Child sexual abuse cases have unique characteristics that
are significant with regard to a prosecutor's discretionary
power and the desire to "avoid uncertainty" when bringing
charges. 283
Unique characteristics that greatly influence
whether or not the prosecutor will bring charges include both
the victim's age, and presence or absence of other witnesses. 284
Issues surrounding young children in regards to their
willingness and ability to testify are important factors when
deciding whether or not to prosecute. 285 Under the SVPA, even
if the perpetrator is eventually convicted of abusing a child,
any evidence that he or she abused any other children where
there were no convictions, cannot be used to qualify the child
molester for a mental evaluation. 286 As a result, child
molesters who abuse very young children are less likely to be
mentally evaluated for their future dangerousness even though
it is arguable that they are dangerous just by their choice of the
most vulnerable of victims. A prosecutor needs to remember
that child molesters who abuse young children are less likely to
be mentally evaluated when deciding to charge a defendant
with sex crimes against one child when there is evidence that
there are multiple victims.
To protect society from sexually violent predators the
SVPA must be changed. The Act should allow for the severity
of the crime and evidence that there were other victims,
regardless of convictions, to be considered when deciding
whether or not to have the offender mentally evaluated for
their potential future risk. Other victims can be identified
through information collected during the investigation of the
convicted crime, as well as talking to the victim of the convicted
crime. Although, using evidence of other victims in the absence
of a conviction may seem objectionable, the proposal here is not
to bring evidence of other possible victims before the trier of
fact, but to make such information available to mental health
See Spohn & Holleran, supra note 203, at 652·653.
Dziech & Schudson, supra note 242, at 36.
285 See Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 246, at 134·135.
286 See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600 (West 2003) (in order to be a
sexually violent predator an individual has to have ''been convicted of a sexually violent
offense against two or more victims ...." Id. § 6600(a)(1) (emphasis added».
283

284
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evaluators. Evidence of other victims is an important source of
information, useful to accurately assess future dangerousness.
Prosecutors can also influence how this Act achieves its
goal of protecting society from sexually violent predators.
Although prosecuting child sexual abuse cases is difficult, the
courts have created ways to facilitate the process, such as
closed-circuit televised testimony,287 leniency on hearsay
issues 288 and allowing children who would otherwise be too
scared to testify to have more support during their
testimony.289 When prosecutors are deciding whether or not to
charge a sex offender with crimes against a particular victim,
they should utilize these facilitating options when assessing
the strength of the evidence, the ability and willingness of the
child to testify and the likelihood of winning a conviction.
Prosecutors also need to take into account what effect their
decision will have on the ability to classify the perpetrator as a
sexually violent predator in the future. If a prosecutor believes
that a child has been sexually abused and that a criminal trial
would not further traumatize the child, then the prosecutor
should bring that case to trial. By bringing the case to trial,
the prosecutor may be protecting both the child victim from
further abuse as well as other children that could be victimized
by the perpetrator in the future.

III.

CONCLUSION

The risk of over predicting the dangerousness of child
molesters for the sake of civil commitment is not as significant
as people think. Instead, the real danger is that sexual
predators are set free without being assessed for their danger
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (West 2003).
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 2003). Allows for the admission of a hearsay
statement to establish the elements of certain crimes "in order to admit as evidence the
confession of a person accused ... " if (a) the child is under 12 and the statement is "in a
written report of a law enforcement official or an employee of a county welfare
department," (b) "[t]he statement describes the minor child as a victim of sexual
abuse," (c) "[t]he statement was made prior to the defendant's confession," (d) "[t]here
are no circumstances ... that would render the statement unreliable," (e) "[t]he minor
child is found to be unavailable ... or refuses to testify" and (f) "[t]he confession was
memorialized in a trustworthy fashion by a law enforcement official." Id.
289 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5 (West 2003).
In cases involving certain
enumerated crimes a prosecuting witness is "entitled, for support, to the attendance of
up to two persons of his or her own choosing ... one of those support persons may
accompany the witness to the witness stand .... " Id. at (a).
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to children. By excluding continuous sexual abuse of a child
from the California SVPA, certain child molesters will not be
mentally evaluated. In addition, the number of child victims of
a child molester is less important than the actual risk that the
child molester will continue to sexually abuse children.
California must change the SVPA, both to include continuous
sexual abuse of a child and to remove the requirement that
there be two identifiable child victims.
Until California changes the SVPA, prosecutors need to
consider its shortcomings when charging child molesters.
Prosecutors need to be aware that incest and continuous sexual
abuse of a child will not result in a risk assessment of the child
molester. In addition, prosecutors should be sure that when
they charge a child molester with both continuous sexual abuse
of a child and lewd and lascivious conduct, the two charges
refer to different acts. Finally, prosecutors need to be careful
when assessing whether or not to take the case to criminal
court. Whenever possible, the prosecutor should pursue the
case in criminal court so the conviction can be used to classify
the child molester as a sexually violent predator. Prosecuting
cases of child sexual abuse is critical to punish the offender, to
ensure he will be mentally evaluated and most importantly, to
protect the innocent child from his abuse.
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